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Abstract: It is a distinctive feature of recent political order that democracy is no longer confined to the nation 
state. Democracy is now applied in complex, pluralist, and globalized settings. These settings are characterized 
by extensive, multiple and overlapping constituencies. Here we might think of the significance of these devel-
opments for self-determining individuals, who are able to influence those interdependencies that are problemat-
ic, such as domination and other ways in which self-determination can be undermined. Democracy serves to 
delegate power to higher and more complex units of decision-making organized around self-determination. 
Some of these units have generative properties, in the sense that they make it possible for deliberation to occur, 
without undermining self-determination. Contestability is part of self-determination, where this goes along 
with forums with the purpose of determining binding norms. In this way, forms of politics emerge based on the 
rights and powers of self-determining democratic citizens. 
 
 
One of the distinctive features of recent political order is that democracy is no longer con-
fined to the nation-state. This is significant in a variety of ways. More than simply being 
applicable in numerous contexts, democracy is no longer about “the People” in the singu-
lar, all with equal standing before the law.  Rather, democracy must now be applied in 
complex, pluralist, and globalized contexts now characterized by extensive, multiple and 
overlapping constituencies that cut across boundaries as well as space and time. While 
many emphasize new non-state forms such as the European Union, they could do so more 
consistently and rigorously if they saw these developments in the context of a larger shift 
away from the long-held view that democracy is “self-legislation,” that is, the act of consti-
tuting a “People” in the singular. Such a People are the subject and authors of the laws that 
they give themselves, a form of what I call the self-legislation conception of democracy.  
However much we have presupposed self-legislation in thinking about democracy at 
any level, it is not only misleading under present circumstances; it is also no longer the 
best way to realize democracy under present global circumstances. Rather, it has become 
increasingly clear that self-legislation, as practiced by Rousseau among others, has now 
become more regressive than progressive, in that its  present realizations are more likely 
to promote rather than minimize domination. Indeed, the primary goal of existing theories 
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of democracy is to identify the progressive possibilities as they emerge from within the 
new circumstances of politics. However, given the circumstances of politics, we cannot 
expect for these kinds of possibilities will remain progressive in light of fundamental 
changes that have as their result that self-legislation now operates in a regressive manner. 
This is the first conundrum of the new circumstances of politics.  What these circum-
stances suggest is that the institutionalization of democracy as self-legislation can no 
longer be considered as progressive.  
Under current circumstances of politics, self-legislation can no longer provide the ba-
sis for realizing democratic norms. The dominance of the self-legislation conception be-
comes regressive rather than progressive when it is confronted by the emergence of com-
plex interdependences and various increasing common forms of vulnerability, which be-
comes particularly difficult to link the fate of each with the fate of all. The model of  self-
legislation is no longer a matter of citizens ultimately sharing their fates with others, since 
only some members of the polity are subject to vulnerability and mutual responsibility. 
Indeed, the great advance of the tradition from Rousseau to Kant was to have an ideal of 
equality, with equal distribution of benefits and burdens. But this idea of self-legislation 
fails to function in such a way as to be both author and subject of the laws. In its place we 
now have differences in vulnerability, which includes the likelihood of some to be ex-
ploited and dominated.  Previously, common vulnerability often has created possibilities 
of advancing flourishing and shared fate. But this has proven unsustainable.  
Certainly we must begin to articulate a basic understanding of self-determination for 
complex, pluralized, and globalized contexts comprised of multiple, overlapping constitu-
encies of which many are extended in space and time. Given this conception of democra-
cy, it must now conceptualize how such territorial constituencies become units of political 
organization. But this is now a matter of delegating power to higher and more complex 
units of decision-making, so that self-determination is a matter of principal-agent link-
ages. Any such unit, which is capable of producing communicative freedom and commu-
nicative power, could be useful to define the scope of self-determination within a system. 
These units may also have generative properties, in the sense that they make possible de-
liberative generation, revision and renewal of collective procedures and decisions. But 
because we do not give ourselves the laws, we do not notice how narrow the scope of 
self-determination has become, particularly how such laws and structures have become 
regressive and ultimately destructive of freedom.  
While self-legislation may be appropriate in some smaller scale societies, it is not 
well-suited to accommodate the new forms of size, scale and complexity. Even more 
challenging is the problem of interdependence, where we now have our fates intertwined 
with other political jurisdictions and by being affected by regimes and structures over 
which we have no effective control. Perhaps one of the greatest risks of this sort of organ-
ization is that the self-legislation model leads naturally to regime structures that often 
make it easy to promote domination; at the same time, regimes modeled on self-
legislation are increasingly unable to address and reduce forms of domination inherent in 
interdependence, and ultimately work so as to undermine the possibilities of self-
determination. Here we might think, positively, of how self-determination requires de-
mocracy, that is: ways in which people can have forms of self-determination, and so that 
democracy can be thought of making it possible for individuals to be able to influence 
those interdependencies that are problematic, such as domination and other ways in which 
self-determination is undermined. For example, there is no longer a loyalty based on citi-
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zenship, but rather a variety of de facto memberships, collective organizations, and net-
works of interdependencies. Furthermore, it is possible to imagine how people have to di-
vide and distribute their political capacities so that they can underwrite and maximize 
forms of self-determination. Thus, democracy should be thought of in the plural, where 
democracy is comprised of multiple and overlapping constituencies, a creation of what I 
call the democratic minimum. The democratic minimum tries to solve the basic problem 
of overcoming democracy as self-legislation, the act of “a people giving itself the laws”, 
as Rousseau puts it.  
The problem with self-legislation is that the contemporary circumstances of politics 
are intensifying unavoidable interdependence, and self-legislation becomes increasingly 
vulnerable to domination and exploitation within the democratic system. Democratic the-
ory is thoroughly based on this response to vulnerability as articulated by Rousseau’s par-
ticipatory democracy and by Kant’s conception of deliberation, both of which continue to 
have a great influence on self-legislation. However, the circumstances of size, scale, com-
plexity and pluralism undermine the Kantian and Rousseauvian conceptions of forming 
democratic constituencies, which delegate powers to higher and more complex units of 
decision-making, based today on primarily principal-agent relationships. While these 
conceptions have lasted for centuries, they are no longer able to achieve basic norms of 
self-determination under the new circumstances of justice. The difficulty is that the self-
legislation model cannot any longer be institutionalized through building constituencies 
that delegate decision-making powers to higher order bodies, primarily delegating deci-
sions to agents who act on behalf of citizen-principals. The new circumstances of politics 
especially undermine democratic norms of self-determination.  Furthermore, differentia-
tion and interdependence disaggregate the various sites for collective decision-making, 
where collectivities cut across various levels of organization, where there are different 
ways in which forms of affectedness lead to what I call domination through non-voluntary 
inclusion. This means that for some, much of their fate is tied to various political jurisdic-
tions, as well as other regimes and structures over which they have no control. Interde-
pendencies challenge the very idea of effective forms of political organization, interde-
pendency of political units cannot easily mobilize and organize on their own behalf.  In 
any case, self-legislation has difficulty in addressing possibilities of domination. In this 
regard, it is clear. Given the problems of self-legislation, it is also clear that the self-
legislation model leads to regimes that are sites of domination. This requires a basic shift 
away from self-legislation to self-determination, which then becomes the basic perspec-
tive for claims to democracy, particularly in the face of complex interdependencies, the 
mastery of which is a task for new forms of democracy, the aim of which in turn is to 
maximize something quite different: self-determination, where self-determination means 
at the very least that individuals are able to have a say over the ways in which various 
sorts of claims can influence their lives, even if self-determination does not require that 
all forms are entirely unter our control, since many forms of self-determination are ones 
that may not require democracy as such. Rather, there are many ways in which individu-
als seek to gain influence. It is better that we think of self-determination in terms of indi-
viduals being able to exert influence by means of the various forms, including capacity 
and standing that will enable them to choose their constituencies that make it possible for 
them to maximize self-determination. Here I think the democratic minimum allows us to 
sustain a vision of democracy as having many different constituencies as a structural ef-
fect of just this kind of democratic minimum that makes it possible for people to remain 
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independent, particularly since it is also true that in most societies exerting influence in 
organizations and networks will have the effect of preserving self-determination as a good 
of democracy. 
1. Beyond Self-Legislation 
By arguing that self-legislation is no longer progressive, I do not mean to deny its norma-
tive power and historical significance as a practical conception of democracy. Rousseau 
provided perhaps the first and also clearest statement of this view. On this account, the 
law that we give ourselves collectively is the same law that we would each give to our-
selves individually, assuring the basis for political equality and shared self-rule. Democ-
racy is accordingly directly concerned with a particular ideal of equality, in that all are 
protected from arbitrary laws to the extent that each has an equal chance to influence col-
lective decision-making. Indeed, self-legislation as a conception of equality is still present 
in both participatory theories of democracy as well as most forms of deliberative democ-
racy. Furthermore, this particular idea of self-rule based on equality remains the core of 
social contract theory, although now self-rule has more often than not been replaced by 
agent-principal relations, now primarily realized in voting and representative forms of 
democracy. As much as this conception has long guided our practices of self-rule, it is ac-
tually unable to deal with the new forms of mutual vulnerability that it has fostered, the 
premise on which self-legislation was originally founded. Yet, at the same time, political 
equality is no longer possible to maintain self-rule and for this reason as the scope and va-
riety of various territorial constituencies increases as directly deliberative democracy be-
comes a matter of independent self-rule.  
Once the more directly deliberative features of self-legislation are in this way lost, a 
higher level of decision-making begins to predominate, in which citizens as principals de-
pend on agents who are responsible for both the decision as well as the implementation of 
the decision. The cost to democracy is that self-legislation is no longer capable of realiz-
ing either political equality or self-determination. If these consequences are correct, citi-
zens lack the legislative standing necessary to avoid forms of domination. Not only does 
such decision-making undermine self-rule, it does so at the cost of democratic equality. If 
these sorts of influences change the current circumstances of politics, the benefits of polit-
ical equality are more and more difficult to maintain, precisely because self-legislation 
now lacks the capacity for democratic self-determination, particularly when self-
legislation no longer informs our fundamental democratic practice. This means that self-
determination must now take the place of self-legislation when it has lost its capacity to 
provide fundamental protections. 
2. Self-Legislation and Self-Determination 
The idea of self-legislation has historically served two main functions: it not only guides 
democratic practices even when these have been externalized into agency relations; at the 
same time it also informs our fundamental democratic practices, particularly at the level 
of implementation and institutionalization. However, it is increasingly clear that many of 
these practices can no longer be implemented unproblematically. Under current circum-
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stances of size, scale, complexity and pluralism, none of which figures prominently in the 
practices of a self-legislating political community, what is needed, at the very least, is a 
full consideration of transnational democracy as providing the means to self-determina-
tion. However appealing forms of self-legislation remain in contexts of mutual vulnerabil-
ity, its implementation needs to be reinterpreted and transformed, in order that new pro-
gressive democratic practices can emerge that include more novel forms of democracy 
among the current set of practices. But the proper judgement of such possibilities requires 
that any alternative to self-legislation must closely monitor changes in the circumstances 
of politics. Crucially, we must now begin to modify Rawls’ Humean idea of the circum-
stances of justice.  
Under the current circumstances of justice, any good theory of democracy must above 
all else be able to uncover the progressive possibilities in the present, possibilities which 
may provide the basis of a better normative ideal of democracy. John Dewey (1988: 199) 
suggests one such democratic alternative to self-legislation, precisely because self-
legislation can no longer identify “those conditions under which the inchoate public may 
function democratically”. Dewey argues that we have come to identify democracy too 
closely with self-legislation, so that it has lost the capacity to be a progressive force for 
change. Transnational politics is not about the futile task of creating self-legislation at 
higher levels of aggregation, but rather demands a new progressive, democratic politics of 
self-determination. Forms of a democracy of self-determination are now progressive just 
in case they aim to realize the basic feasible democratic norms capable of facing many 
different challenges, because of larger numbers of people affected by political decisions 
as well as the emergence of constituencies so diverse and variable that it is difficult to or-
ganize self-legislation so as to overcome the increasing vulnerability of democracy. The 
same is true for temporal influence, since many decisions may have large effects on the 
self-determination of future generations. Such decision-making is aggregative, in ways 
that make differential affectedness more and more common, even as diverse constituen-
cies make it difficult to organize decisions so as to achieve democratic nondomination 
and self-determination. Some form of self-determination is thus necessary to establish the 
fair value of rights across borders. But first, we need to examine the pathologies of self-
legislation under such circumstances of justice. 
These current circumstances of politics raise other normative problems for standard 
democratic decision-making. Many forms of decision-making are now no longer central-
ized, but rather dispersed and differentiated in ways that often make it such that they can-
not be located within any single polity, a disunity that is a strong limitation of the very 
idea of self-legislation.  Collective decision-making, if it is made at all, is increasingly 
made across very different circumstances than those within a single state or polity. While 
some collective decision-making remains territorial, many, if not most, collective deci-
sions are no longer made within states, and if they are, they are dispersed across a variety 
of levels of organization and in a variety of different locations and political systems. Due 
to multiple forms of interdependence, governments now outsource many different types 
of decisions to disaggregated sites for collective decision-making, now operating at mul-
tiple levels and in very different institutional settings that employ a wide array of institu-
tions and media. At these sites, the fate of individuals is a feature of the world. It is also 
true that such decisions are intertwined with other political jurisdictions. This is a conse-
quence of such disaggregation because of multiple forms of interdependence, making the 
fate of disparate peoples intertwined, even as many such decisions are made in processes 
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that leave little or no citizen input, an important way in which disaggregation works in 
both positive and negative consequences that are not under direct control of agents or 
principals. 
As the scale and complexity of these interactions grow, it becomes more difficult for 
citizens to organize into constituencies in order to exercise influence over collective out-
comes directly, even within their own polity. This is true even when these constituencies 
are originally based on self-legislation; they are increasingly organized around freedom as 
self-determination. This problem is especially acute, since global interactions, interde-
pendence and decision-making themselves increase the potential for domination, given 
that there is little relationship between the transnational scope of interdependence and the 
capacities of decisional units of current forms of political organization. In this case self-
legislation becomes unable to address the emerging forms of domination, in particular 
domination through non-voluntary inclusion in institutions, which no longer generate 
democratic self-determination.   
In the next section, I turn to the weaknesses of the present regime of freedom from 
domination. The current implementation of self-determination and self-legislation are in-
sufficient for political freedom under the current circumstances of justice. The lack here is 
a failure of self-legislation and not self-determination, since it fails to find an appropriate 
basis for the regulation of liberty. While it is possible that attempts at self-determination 
may lead to self-determination and thus develop new forms of collective self-determina-
tion. In this case, people are subjects and authors of the law as they join with others who 
do not have full standing in the political community in which they jointly exercise their 
self-determining capacities. In this case, they do not lack self-legislation but freedom as 
self-determination. In this way, it is possible to modify Rawls’ idea of the “circumstances 
of justice”. Indeed, here Dewey is correct that any alternative to self-legislation under 
new conditions which we need now to elaborate, as John Dewey did, bears the question of 
how we can develop “those conditions under which a deliberative public may function 
democratically”. Or to put it another way, the forms of democracy are progressive just in 
case that they aim to realize the basic feasible democratic norms of self-determination in 
the face of many different challenges to democracy, including future generations. Other 
changes to self-determination include interdependencies, size, and complexity. Indeed, 
many forms of decision-making are now dispersed and differentiated in ways that cannot 
be located in a single polity. 
3. Democracy, Self-Determination and Nondomination  
In order to escape the dilemmas of self-legislation, it is now necessary to rethink the idea 
of “the self” in self-legislation and self-determination. Under the new circumstances of 
politics, it is no longer “the People” who exercise final control over collective decisions. 
If this change in the circumstances of politics is necessary, then self-determination rather 
than self-legislation has at this historical juncture greater salience. Indeed, self-determina-
tion is part of the republican ideal of justice based on shared freedom from domination. 
The relevant affectedness of persons concerns freedom from domination and in so doing 
achieves a variety of crosscutting forms of membership in multiple constituencies and 
networks in place of the single ideal of self-legislation. Under the current circumstances 
of politics, some forms of interdependency may well lead to the loss of self-determina-
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tion, especially with regard to increased susceptibility to domination.  However, in many 
cases affectedness supports rather than undermines self-determination and democracy, so 
that there are forms of republicanism that can develop a direct means to sharing in social 
status of equality.1 At the same time, some forms of affectedness can operate to enhance 
rather than to undermine self-determination. In cases of problematic interdependency, 
however, access to a variety of institutions and networks that operate democratically can 
in this way begin to find the means for dealing with the many-sided consequences of in-
terdependence. This indicates that self-determination is in fact promoted by open forms of 
membership that activate various powers and capabilities in situations in which affected-
ness is collectively experienced negatively by many. Moreover, overcoming such nega-
tive affectedness requires equity or corrective justice across constituencies. By extending 
membership according to current forms of relatedness, they are able to form and reform 
those constituencies that are able to address the whole variety of those affected by prob-
lematic interdependencies that produce domination. This also includes promoting self-
determination by membership and shared ends that activate powers and capacities both 
individually and collectively. 
Rather than looking for nondomination simply as the pooled self-determination across 
states, such regulatory powers are often provided by jointly shared constitutional issues. 
Thus, multiple and overlapping constituencies and networks provide a better basis for a 
new democratic minimum in an interdependent world. Nor can we assume that democra-
cy is based on some specific collective site or institution for decision-making. Instead of 
concentrating powers in one institution, democracy disaggregates them in order to provide 
citizens with the means by which they are able to maximize available possibilities for 
self-determination. Given that these circumstances of politics are shared by many across 
the globe, overlapping memberships and constituencies are required in order that they 
achieve mutually self-reinforcing nondomination. 
Seen in this way, shared democratic practice now has the explicitly avowed goal of 
providing the means by which properly governed constituencies are able to minimize 
domination. It can be realized in many different institutions and at many different levels 
including formal international institutions and nongovernmental organizations. Current 
transnational publics do not always understand themselves as contributing to the overall 
democratization of the international system as publics. In the absence of responsive insti-
tutions, most transnational associations take contestation to be their task rather than popu-
lar control as their fundamental political purpose. Nonetheless, many transnational net-
works and movements seek to resist domination, usually by attaining some degree of 
shared influence over interdependencies and decisions. For our purposes, it is not so much 
networks as such that are important, but the ways in which such forms of contestation po-
tentially transform those affected in publics. While contestation over and against large-
scale international organizations such as multinational corporations is necessary, publics 
can do more as initiators of democratization as self-determination. In this role, they are 
able to shift authority away from states and their agents who govern them back to the 
principals themselves who are again capable of exercising popular control and accounta-
bility. This task is admittedly made more difficult by the ways in which transnational pub-
lics are formed, often without the benefit of a unifying forum in which they might be 
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90 Zeitschrift für Politische Theorie, Heft 1/2014  
thought to constitute themselves as expressing their democratic will. But this is a 
pipedream of self-legislation that is sufficient for self-determination. The central point 
here is that transnational democracy must operate in such a way as to allow citizens the 
powers, standing and capacity to exercise influence so that it becomes possible for publics 
to steer problematic interdependencies toward shared, collective ends.  
Democracy should not merely allow citizens to exercise influence as members of 
multiple and overlapping constituencies; it should make it possible that differently situat-
ed persons (qua individuals) have the freedom necessary to promote both, by their equal 
standing and powers, political agency and sufficient self-determination. Given the poten-
tial for domination inherent in asymmetric interdependence (as well as the potential for 
mutual recognition), what sort of democratic institutions and practices could promote 
nondomination? Here we need to think in terms of levels of democratic influence so as to 
be able to address a variety of constituencies comprised of different principals who share 
the common aim of self-determination. This sort of self-determination is not determined 
once and for all, but rather through ongoing democratic experimentalism, the task of 
which is to explore the democratic possibilities within an overlapping and empowered so-
cial space created by emerging constituencies all of whom have interests in responding to 
the new circumstances of politics. These circumstances also influence how we understand 
the various possibilities to achieve self-determination. Self-determination is a republican 
good: it is possible not because some are free qua citizens, but that they may widen their 
available freedom when they share interests across transnational constituencies. Such 
forms of freedom are not possible on the self-legislation model, to the extent that self-
legislation is increasingly unable to control most decisions directly except collectively 
and seek to exercise its powers so as to exercise influence over problematic interdepend-
encies. 
4. Self-Determination and the Sources of Generativity 
As applied to present-day democracies, a crucial challenge to the idea of the will of the 
people is that standard conceptions of self-legislation do not have sufficient institutional 
complexity to challenge emerging and often nondemocratic decision-making regimes. 
Arguably, then, a necessary move in rehabilitating the idea of the will of the people in 
modern times is to conceive of it not as located somewhere.  By the same token, the will 
of the people cannot be defined in abstraction from such actual institutions and their oper-
ations (as some attempt to do when they think of it in terms of various forms of aggrega-
tion). Because of the indirect character of the popular legitimation of authority, citizens 
must be able to influence the authority exercised within such institutions, at least in those 
cases in which they are the object of arbitrary rule that undermines self-determination. 
But, as I have argued, in most cases we should understand “we the people” as pluralized 
and diverse constituencies, with openness to variable forms of domination through inter-
dependence. In cases of interdependence, transnational constituencies require that people 
not only have significant multiple memberships, but also that they have the opportunity to 
participate in deliberation about various functionally defined decision-making processes 
that cut across institutional memberships. Indeed, under these conditions there must be in-
stitutions, which can act so as to extend the capability and standing of individuals to ad-
dress institutions that are directly concerned with addressing the potential for increasing 
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levels of domination. Self-determination is, as Pettit (1996) once put it, not merely a form 
of power, but also of antipower, the power that only shared freedom makes possible. Un-
der the current circumstances of politics, some forms of interdependence may well lead to 
the loss of self-determination and susceptibility to domination and loss of lack of standing 
needed to have access to various institutions and networks that operate democratically. 
Self-determination in such circumstances requires open forms of membership that activate 
powers and capabilities that are able to address those problematic interdependencies that 
produce domination. The key issue is to identify the sources of powers not only in states, 
rather, democracy is in this view simply whatever provides citizens with the means by 
which they are able to increase their capacity for self-determination, the basis for a global 
democratic minimum. 
How might this kind of dynamic and collective process work to lessen domination 
and maximize self-determination? There seems no denying that numerous innovations 
have over the long historical term made democracy a better means to achieve the ends of 
justice than its past realizations. At the same time, there is good evidence to cast doubt on 
Jane Addams’ adage, that the only “cure for the ills of democracy is more democracy” 
(Addams 1902: 8). While endorsing this hopeful stance, Dewey (1988: 325) immediately 
introduces a proviso: it can remedy its ills only by becoming a democracy that is genuine-
ly “different in kind”. Otherwise, democracy seems to face a vicious circularity diagnosed 
by Iris Marion Young (2002:35): “for democracy to promote justice, it must already be 
just”. Call this the “democratic circle”. While injustice may never be said to disappear, 
the circle can become virtuous through the “democratic minimum”, the achievement of 
equal normative statuses sufficient for citizens to exercise their creative powers to reshape 
democracy according to the demands of justice. The account of this conception of democ-
racy that I offer here is deliberative, one that depends on the relationship between deliber-
ation, accountability and the capacity of citizens to introduce novel demands and claims 
in response to unjust circumstances. Democracy is on this understanding that set of insti-
tutions and procedures by which individuals are empowered as free and equal citizens to 
form and change the terms of their common life together, including democracy itself. In 
this sense, democracy is reflexive, to the extent that it consists in procedures and practices 
that make it possible to achieve the minimum powers and conditions necessary for self-
determination as well as a means to nondomination.  This understanding of rights as nor-
mative statuses and powers provides the conceptual basis for addressing nonideal situa-
tions in which interdependencies undermine self-determination and the current form of 
the global democratic minimum conceived of in an institutionally distributed fashion. 
The purpose of the conception of the democratic minimum is then to describe the 
necessary, but not sufficient conditions for democratic arrangements to become a means 
to realize justice under appropriate nonideal conditions. Even if these conditions are real-
ized, a democracy will not necessarily be just in all its dealings. It may not even be just in 
all domains in which citizens are obligated, and it may not be just in relation to those 
noncitizens affected by its decisions whom they dominate. To the extent that the mini-
mum is a matter of degree, it can be specified along a number of dimensions and by a va-
riety of procedures. But once this minimum is met under extant circumstances, a democ-
racy cannot become more just without becoming more democratic at the same time, and 
vice versa. The democratic minimum is thus required for existing institutions to be suffi-
ciently reflexive. If they are, then they have become sources of generative of justice even 
as they promote fundamental political equality across multiple and overlapping peoples 
92 Zeitschrift für Politische Theorie, Heft 1/2014  
within and across polities – democracies that recognize the political rights of the citizens 
of other democracies, and thus all the citizens, and assure a whole variety of minima of 
self-determination. These would apply to various locations, modes and avenues for the 
exercise of influence over decisions. Just as citizens within a polity may disagree with one 
another as to whether or not they are violating the democratic minimum, so, too, will 
many citizen constituencies within a variety of different polities.  
The issue of constituency in both cases is one of shared normative statuses and pow-
ers: that is, whether or not someone has the normative power to make a claim about which 
others will genuinely deliberate. Given this understanding of the democratic minimum, 
we can interpret rights as assuring conditions of nondomination as necessary for political 
agency. Mark Warren (2010: 53) properly identifies the importance of rights in that they 
are “generative of a particular kind of politics”, that is, a politics based on the powers of 
citizens qua self-determining groups and individuals; they do so by minimizing domina-
tion and securing self-determination. Thus, the democratic minimum creates a virtuous 
circle, leading to greater justice and the capacity of individuals to expand status and create 
conditions under which publics are able to form and re-form as new demoi emerge. Con-
stitutions have a similar role in securing statuses and transforming decision-making so as 
to create a regularized basis for nondomination as the guiding principle of political order. 
But the democratic minimum and its institutionalization depend on the ongoing develop-
ment of experimental institutions that are able to reflexively realize the transformation of 
political life across borders. Here is an instance of a possible difference principle for non-
domination: no increases in freedom overall (say by gains in institutional efficacy) that do 
not also at the same time decrease the extent and intensity of domination. Many interna-
tional institutions fail to meet this standard and may increase domination while increasing 
their own efficacy and efficiency. Transnational status is generative and creates equality 
across borders, creating new possibilities and forms of democratic decision-making con-
sistent with the new circumstances of politics. 
Furthermore, the possibility of a constitutional order regularizes the appropriate 
openness to revision and deliberation that makes it a fundamental requirement of democ-
racy, whether with respect to governance or government. The power of amendment alone 
is not sufficient for the democratic minimum. But what is distinctive about a constitution-
al order is the use of political rights to create the possibility of “reordering the order it-
self” (Sabel 1997: 159). As James Tully (2002:217) points out, this reflexive capacity 
must go all the way down (even if not all at once): “if citizens are to be free, then the pro-
cedures by which they deliberate, the reasons they accept as public reasons and the prac-
tices of governance they are permitted to test by these democratic means must not be im-
posed from the outside but must themselves be open to deliberation and amendment”. At 
the very least, constitutions are devices for achieving nondomination: a constitution gives 
citizens normative powers over normative powers, so that deploying a constitution signif-
icantly expands and regularizes  rights and duties, including the power to change the as-
signment of rights and duties. 
For these reasons, constitutions need not be effective only within states, and it is clear 
that the transnational entities such as the European Union could also benefit from having 
constitutional dimensions for its political process, in particular to the degree that rights are 
articulated enough so as to provide an effective means to make moral claims. Here we 
should look more closely at the ways in which exclusions in the rights regime might be op-
erative at the transnational level, and thus require institutions that create the space for the 
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free and equal capacity for individual political agency. How might this work? The robust 
realization of various powers and statuses has made the member states in the European Un-
ion more rather than less democratic. This is because the realization is neither functionally 
specific nor hierarchical. For example, the existence of EU-level courts has broadly impact-
ed the legal recognition of immigrants’ rights, by giving them the normative power to ap-
peal directly to the European Human Rights Court. Indeed, the European Convention on 
Human Rights already entitles foreigners without nationality in any EU member state to ap-
peal to the European Human Rights Court and the EU Court of Justice for the ongoing ju-
ridical recognition of their rights, creating adjudicative institutions that build upon the con-
stitutional traditions of member states, even as they are extended to noncitizens.2  
In addition to the normative powers contained in the legal status of citizenship (EU or 
otherwise), the multiplication of institutions whose task it is to preserve the conditions of 
nondomination makes such powers and statuses more robust. EU-level institutions can 
thus “serve to make these states more democratic”.3 The extension of human rights in the 
EU even to noncitizens without naturalization shows the advantages of multiply realizing 
human rights in differentiated institutions, even as these powers are a source of further 
contestation against them by citizens. In the case of human rights in the EU, their realiza-
tion at multiple levels enhances the power of citizens to initiate deliberation by giving 
each institution a quasi-open agenda. 
The European Union also provides examples of how to institutionalize a deliberative 
process non-hierarchically as a solution to the problem of multiple units. Once we aban-
don the assumption that there must be a unified global public sphere connected to a single 
set of state-like authority structures, the easier it is to see how the democratic character of 
transnational deliberation could become a means to self-determination. As Charles Sabel 
has argued, a “directly deliberative” design in many ways incorporates epistemic innova-
tions and increased capabilities of economic organizations, in the same way as the regula-
tory institutions of the New Deal followed the innovative patterns of industrial organiza-
tion in the centralized mass production they attempted to administer and regulate 
(Dorf/Sabel 1998: 292). Roughly, such a form of nested and collaborative decision-
making uses highly dispersed collaborative processes of jointly defining problems and 
setting goals that was already typical in many large firms with dispersed sites of produc-
tion. Here we can turn to specific proposals made by democratic experimentalist concep-
tions of deliberative processes that enhance complex and multilevel order. The feature of 
the OMC, for example, is quite different from simple delegation. 
Thus, while these publics are highly dispersed and distributed, various levels of delib-
eration permit public testing and correction, even if they do not hierarchically override 
decisions at lower levels. As Dahl (1983: 103) puts it, “the criteria of the democratic pro-
cess presuppose the rightfulness of the unit itself”. The democratic minimum suggests 
equal input, so long as these kinds of processes do not depend on boundaries that are en-
tirely contingent on past circumstances.4 
                                                        
2 Joseph Weiler (1998: 719) points to the case of Gayusuz versus Austria that went to the European Court 
of Human Rights and led to the extension of social security benefits to third country nationals.  
3 On the democratizing role of the EU with respect to human rights, see Bowman (2006). On the rights of 
immigrants to political participation in the EU on republican grounds, see Honohan (2002: 238–239). 
4 Such a historical approach is defended by Allan Buchanan (2004); this argument could be developed fur-
ther with a different historical account of the democratic minimum; as it stands, it only partially fulfills the 
necessary conditions for making a multi-unit polity democratic enough to be a means to justice. 
94 Zeitschrift für Politische Theorie, Heft 1/2014  
The reference to these sometimes local and bounded criteria that settle units that make 
judgments helps us to avoid indeterminate consequentialist arguments about aiming at the 
greatest overall justice in the long term. The point is rather to promote justice where pos-
sible through the democratic minimum. Practices that cut across borders expand the scope 
of participation that is not tied directly to the citizenship in a specific demos; instead 
standing is expanded and freed from the requirement of specific citizenship as ensuring 
status. This kind of expansion of standing in the EU is not necessarily based on preexist-
ing citizenship, but may emerge across peoples and borders. Thus, the transnational sta-
tuses of participants in such practices provide them with a generative form of self-
determination and create equality across borders, new possibilities and democratic media 
for decision-making.  
Conclusion: Democratic Experimentalism, Justice and Political 
Equality 
Given that the circumstances of politics have changed, what are the feasible options for 
inclusive and generative democracy? The new circumstances of politics have wide rami-
fications, since they spell the end of the usefulness of self-legislation as the way to incor-
porate self-determination. It is not just the circumstances of politics that have changed, 
but these circumstances in fact go deeper and fundamentally alter “the circumstances of 
justice”. These ever-changing circumstances also play an important role in many collec-
tive decisions, especially concerning issues of the inclusion of people across borders af-
fected by various non-voluntary forms of interdependence.  In these cases, there must be 
ways to create the rights and standing of people that is not directly the result of citizenship 
within a state. In fact, it is the case that under the current circumstances of politics self-
legislation is unable to deal with the now common problems of size, scale, complexity 
and pluralism; when it does so, it often does so in ways that undermine democracy, given 
the ways in which the current conceptions are unable to deal with new forms of constitu-
encies. Self-legislation now stands in the way of realizing more robust democratic norms 
of self-determination at different levels of scale and thus across borders. If this analysis is 
correct, then we have entered a new phase of democratic experimentalism, that is, a pro-
cess of democratically reshaping the new circumstances of politics. 
If we look at changes in democratic practices, we can see at least three trends that 
have to do with the new circumstances of politics and justice. The first trend is economic 
and neo-liberal, based on the openness of borders to the world market. This understanding 
seems to depend on judgments at a large scale, based on unavoidably indeterminate con-
sequentialist arguments about producing the greatest overall well-being over the long 
term. This is certainly one possible experiment, but it is not a democratic one. It heightens 
rather than lessens the possibilities of exploitation and domination, nor does it promote 
much in the way of self-determination. Such circumstances of justice require democratic 
processes that limit domination and secure statuses and powers for all those affected. 
The second possibility is based on closed political communities rather than open mar-
kets. It is based on a narrow form of the self-legislation model. Under this form of the 
model, the people are the authors and subjects of the law. Should it be thought to apply to 
the narrower circumstances of politics, its emphasis on common vulnerability and human 
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dignity make it deeply appealing. But like the open economic model, this model leads to a 
fundamental narrowing of the initial conception of democracy. Instead of openness, it 
produces a closed order based on ideas of citizenship, in which one enters at birth and ex-
its only at death, to use Rawls’ injunction.5 While this approach may exercise benevo-
lence towards needy strangers around the world (as Miller proposes), it does so at the 
price of the possibility of a shared democracy, global or otherwise. But this conception of 
democracy is simply too closed to address the new circumstances of politics, which can-
not survive as such a closed conception and internal commitment to a narrow account of 
nondomination among citizens. Democracy is understood as a means to justice, but for a 
particular kind of community.6 However perfectionist its conception of the common good 
is, it cannot avoid the domination of those outside its borders as inherent in such a closed 
conception of the good. The current circumstances of justice only heighten the likelihood 
that such an order is dominating as inclusive from within and exclusive from without. 
Such a democratic polity does not promote the democratic minimum.  
Transnational democracy alone provides a basis on which we can reconceive democ-
racy in a complex, pluralized and globalized context. Crucial to this conception is the re-
publican core of nondomination that is concerned not only with the nondomination of in-
dividuals, but also with domination that is the result of collective decisions. As Onora 
O’Neill also suggests, the fact of interdependence raises important issues with regard to 
nondomination. When considering affectedness, the fact that democratic citizens are au-
thors and subjects of their own laws does not necessarily reduce their potential for domi-
nation. Here the problem is that this conception of affectedness is really better conceived 
as an issue that democracy ought to promote self-determination in the face of forms of in-
terdependence that undermines this freedom. Under these circumstances, the democratic 
minimum is hardly minimal, since individuals will on this account also have the powers 
to exercise influence with others over problematic interdependencies. The democratic 
minimum is thus not just a set of specific rights, but rather the normative basis on which 
multiple actors in overlapping polities can exercise self-determination. It is that minimum 
of powers that provides just such necessary conditions needed for democratization, that is, 
for all those who are affected to be able to form and change the terms of their common 
life. The democratic minimum is not directly a matter of equal citizenship, but rather ap-
plies to everyone equally in any situation with the potential for domination. It is certainly 
a democratic achievement, since not every polity on its own will be able to provide that 
basis for enabling fundamental transnational equality based on nondomination. 
Despite the limits of the European Union, one important dimension of the EU is the 
way it makes possible interactions between publics and institutions that facilitate influ-
ence over dispersed decision-making processes now for multiple and overlapping demoi. 
But the new circumstances of politics require more than interaction with institutions, now 
that interdependence has become more and more pervasive and potentially dominating. 
While the democratic minimum serves to disperse powers of self-determination across 
levels, the form of self-rule that it requires should not establish such freedoms at the cost 
of new inequalities.  The global democratic minimum must be able to extend an equal 
right to self-determination to all whose affectedness undermines such freedom and pro-
vide the basis for overcoming domination. With this emphasis on nondomination, cosmo-
                                                        
5 See John Rawls (2005: 12). 
6 For one such attempt, see David Miller (2003). 
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politan powers and rights create conditions for nondomination and provide the proper aim 
of a generative and inclusive form of an open democracy, including a self-determining 
democracy.  
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